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This thesis presents evidence on the relationship between the people’s perception of the 
quality of their country’s formal institutions and their likelihood to express higher levels of 
social trust. I use regression analysis in a quasi-experimental framework in order to measure 
the differential effect of a variation in institutional quality on the evolution of social trust 
among individuals who possess different characteristics, which make them more or less likely 
to perceive and appreciate that variation. I use World Values Survey and the European 
Values Survey cross-sectional survey data that covers the period 1993 through 2012 in six 
waves. The variation used is the creation and subsequent success of a powerful 
anticorruption agency in Romania that has been tasked with the prosecution of high-profile 
individuals in corruption-related offenses since 2006. I find that the institutional variation 
has a stronger effect upon the evolution of generalized social trust among urban respondents 
in the post-treatment period, but not among frequent newsreaders and those who report a 
greater level of interest in politics. I also find that the treatment has a positive differential 
effect on the level of institutional trust reported by frequent newsreader and people who are 
interested in politics, but not urban respondents. However, given the quasi-experimental 
nature of the research design and the limitations of the two datasets used in this thesis, causal 
identification is difficult and the empirical results should therefore be interpreted with 
caution. 
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1.1 Research Question 
 
 
This thesis investigates the origins of social trust. This research question deserves to be 
examined more closely for two reasons. First, despite the growing popularity of the notion of 
social trust since Putnam’s groundbreaking work on social capital theory in the early 1990s, 
its determinants have not yet been clearly identified and remain a largely understudied topic. 
Second, the variable of social trust appears to be positively correlated with multiple socially 
desirable outcomes, such as democratization, personal life satisfaction, and economic growth 
(Newton 2001; Mironova 2015; Algan and Cahuc 2013; Knack 2001). Therefore, gaining a 
better understanding of the root causes of social trust could potentially help policymakers 
craft more trust-friendly policies and institutions, which in turn would have a beneficial effect 
on society as a whole.  
The rest of the thesis is structured as follows: in the first chapter, I explain the broader 
relevance of the research question and summarize the content of the thesis; in the second 
chapter, I define the dependent and independent variables, and review the main theories 
related to the determinants of social trust; in the third chapter, I describe the main theoretical 
contribution of this paper to the social trust literature; in the fourth chapter, I provide a 
detailed background of Romania’s post-communist history leading up to the creation of the 
National Anticorruption Directorate (i.e. DNA); in the fifth, sixth and seventh chapters, I 
outline my empirical strategy, present my results, and conclude with a discussion of my 






1.2 Relevance of Research Question 
 
 
Although there is little academic consensus regarding how social trust is produced or 
maintained, the social science literature almost unanimously acknowledges social trust as a 
valuable societal resource. The benefits of social trust can be broken down into three broad 
categories, namely social, economic, and political. 
 First, sociologists have embraced social trust as a means for building and maintain 
strong and durable social relationships. Scholars argue that cultivating social trust can help 
rebuild struggling communities or accelerate the development of communities that are already 
strong (Wilson 1997; Hearn 1997). More specifically, at the individual level, trust has been 
shown to promote volunteering, participation in communal activities (Uslaner 2002), and 
recycling (Sønderskov 2011).  
Second, economists have also acknowledged the relevance of social trust in promoting 
economic growth. For example, Mill identifies the “rarity of persons who are supposed fit to 
be trusted with the receipt […] of large sums of money” as one of the main impediments to 
conducting business (1848, 133). Similarly, Hardin describes trust as a symbolic commodity 
that is necessary for the success of market economy (2001). Other scholars argue that social 
trust functions as a lubricant that facilitates economic exchanges and thus contributes to the 
creation of a business-friendly climate of interpersonal cooperation (North, 1990; Misztal 
1996; Arrow 2000; Krishna 2000). Putnam argues that regional differences in social trust 
(and more broadly speaking, social capital) across the Italian territory could partly explain 
why the North has managed to outperform the South in terms of both economic growth and 
institutional performance (1995). At the aggregate level, several studies have found that high 
levels of social trust are generally associated with high economic growth and human 
development rates (Algan and Cahuc 2013; Knack and Keefer 1997).  
																																																																																																																																																Baconschi 11	
Third, political scientists have extensively discussed the political and institutional 
implications of social trust accumulation. In fact, several 19th century political theorists have 
emphasized the importance of social trust for the development of the modern state. For 
instance, in his study of American democracy, Tocqueville acknowledges the role of social 
cohesion and mutual trust in encouraging political participation and building a successful 
democratic system. Uslaner remarks that individuals living in communities that exhibit high 
levels of social trust are more likely to cooperate for the common good of society (2002). 
Similarly, Putnam claims that social trust allows individuals to act together more effectively 
and pursue shared objectives (1993). In more practical terms, social trust has also been shown 
to promote tax payment (Scholz and Lubell 1998) as well as more effective democratic 
government (Knack 2002).  
 It is therefore clear that social trust promotes desirable collective outcomes. From the 
point of view of policymakers and institutional actors, the follow-up question to the evidence 
of the positive effects of social trust should be how could this valuable resource be built up?  
 
1.3 Roadmap  
 
 
In first part of this paper, I argue that people infer the trustworthiness of their fellow citizens 
by evaluating the quality of the formal institutions that govern their community. This 
mechanism builds upon the notion of representativeness, which refers to a heuristic decision-
making rule that people use to determine the probability of an event under uncertainty. 
Representativeness suggests that people expect an event, object, or person, to be similar in 
essential characteristics to its parent population. In this thesis, I argue that people gauge the 
trustworthiness of other citizens by taking into account the characteristics of the institutions 
with which they are associated.  
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This thesis uses quasi-experimental research design in order to determine whether a 
positive variation in a country’s institutional quality has an effect on the evolution of social 
trust among the country’s citizens. I incorporate both the generalized and institutional 
dimensions of social trust in my analysis. I limit the scope of the study to Romania and use 
regression analysis of pooled World Values Survey and European Values Survey data 
collected between 1993 and 2012 to identify the differential effect of the creation and 
subsequent success of a powerful anticorruption agency on internal levels of social trust 
among different categories of respondents, who were more or less likely to perceive and 
appreciate this institutional improvement. More specifically, I categorize respondents by the 
size of the city, the frequency of political news consumption, and their reported level of 
political interest. This experiment is effective because it exploits an exogenous, unexpected, 
and meaningful improvement in the state’s ability to reduce corruption that did not affect 
everyone equally. Although causal identification is difficult, the results of such a study can 
still offer valuable insights regarding the relationship between institutions and social trust.  
The empirical analysis shows mixed results. First, I find that the institutional variation 
has a stronger effect upon the evolution of generalized social trust among urban respondents 
in post-treatment period, but not among frequent newsreaders and those who report a greater 
level of interest in politics. I also find that the treatment has a positive differential effect on 
the level of institutional trust reported by frequent newsreader and people who are interested 
in politics, but not urban respondents.  
Therefore, this paper provides limited evidence that positive variations in the quality 
of formal institutions, such as the one embodied by the creation of the DNA, could potentially 
facilitate the accumulation of social trust within society. The contributions of this paper are 
both theoretical, since I describe an original mechanism that incorporates concepts used in the 
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field of psychology, as well as methodological, since I identify and exploit a unique 






















































2.1.1 Defining Social Trust 
 
 
During the 1990s and 2000s, the concept of social trust has become increasingly popular in a 
wide range of social science disciplines, including sociology, economics, and political 
science. Despite its recent popularity, however, social trust remains a complex and ambiguous 
notion that does not have a single commonly accepted definition in the political science 
literature. In fact, a wide variety of definitions and interpretations of this concept have been 
put forward over the years, but no consensus has been reached as to what social trust actually 
means. Therefore, the first difficulty of studying social trust is trying to define it in a clear and 
concise manner.  
 The concept of social trust has often been conflated with social capital. In fact, much 
of the recent literature on social capital treats the two notions as synonymous (Wilson 1997; 
Brehm and Rahn 1997; Arrow 2000). However, the theoretical relationship between them 
remains unclear. According to Putnam, social trust is a marker of social capital, which 
represents the collective value of all the social networks that pervade society (1993). In other 
words, social trust is one of the many informal norms that govern the behavior of individuals 
in a community and allow them to form social bonds. Similar to other norms, the level of 
social trust determines the size and quality of social networks because it affects the way in 
which people interact, cooperate, exchange etc. Thus, from this perspective, social trust 
appears to be both a constituent and derivative of social capital. 
However, while Putnam is certainly correct in characterizing social trust as one of the 
essential components of social capital, he fails to provide a more concrete definition of this 
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concept. Therefore, in this paper, I build upon Putnam’s understanding of social trust and 
define it as the willingness of citizens to trust other members of their community. But what 
exactly does trusting others actually mean? In order to provide a satisfactory answer to this 
question, I refer to the three most commonly cited definitions of trust and attempt to 
incorporate them into a simple, unified framework. First, Hardin succinctly defines social 
trust as “encapsulated interest”; in other words, the people’s incentive to be trustworthy is 
grounded in the belief that it is in their own interest to take other people’s interests into 
consideration (1998, 12 – 15). Second, Warren argues that trust embodies an individual’s 
conviction that most members of their community either have common interests or at least 
will not seek to harm others (1999, 311). Third, Gambetta claims that the decision to be more 
or less trusting towards others is determined by the subjective probability with which people 
assess whether other agents and entities will perform certain actions that will be beneficial, or 
at least not detrimental to them (1988, 217). Therefore, despite using different formulations, 
all of the aforementioned authors seem to imply that social trust is the belief that other people 
or institutions will, at worst, not do you harm, and at best, act in your interests.  
This definition encompasses two different kinds of social trust, namely generalized 
and institutional trust, both of which are covered in this paper. Generalized trust only 
concerns the individual’s propensity to trust an abstract, distant other (i.e. citizen or member 
of the community), rather than a close family member, friend, or colleague. Institutional trust 












2.1.2 Defining Institutional Quality 
 
 
Similar to social trust, the concept of institutional quality can also be difficult to define. 
Before providing a working definition, however, it might be useful to first describe what 
institutions are. According to Huntington, institutions are “stable, valued, recurring patterns 
of behavior” (1968, 9). Analogously, Helmke and Levinsky state that institutions are “rules 
and procedures that structure social interaction by constraining and enabling actors’ behavior” 
(2004, 5). In other words, institutions are structures that govern the behavior of individuals 
within a given community by creating and enforcing certain rules of conduct. Institutions can 
be further divided into two different kinds, namely formal and informal. Formal institutions 
are embodied in concrete state-enforced rules, which include written constitutions, laws, 
policies, regulations etc. Informal institutions represent the social norms, customs and 
conventions that shape the thought and behavior of the members of a society (Leftwich and 
Sen 2010; Berman 2013). Furthermore, the power held by formal institutions can either be de 
jure, which refers to the formal, official status of an institution, or de facto, which refers to 
situations that are true for practical reasons. This thesis deals exclusively with the quality of 
formal institutions and their de facto power, which in turn affects the evolution of internal 
levels of social trust. 
But what exactly does institutional quality mean? Various different measures of the 
quality of a country’s governance and institutions have been used in the political science 
literature. Despite the multifaceted nature of this concept, however, the following six 
indicators of institutional quality tend to be employed the most often: accountability, political 
stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption 
(Kandil 2009). In this paper, I refer to the concept of institutional quality as the state’s 
capacity to control corruption; therefore, I “operationalize” this variable by identifying an 
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institutional variation that leads to an improvement in the state’s de facto ability to reduce its 
levels of corruption.  
 
2.2  Literature Review 
 
 
Broadly speaking, there are two main theoretical approaches regarding the question of the 
origins and nature of social trust. In order to better situate the theoretical argument used in 
this paper, it is necessary to review the conceptual frameworks of these two schools of 
thought. The names and main variables of the theories mentioned below are presented in 
Table 1.  
 The first major theory of social trust, also known as the individual approach, argues 
that social trust is a core inheritable personality trait of individuals (Erikson 1950; Allport 
1961; Cattell 1965; Rosenberg 1956). According to this view, social trust is learned in early 
childhood through primary socialization and persists throughout the individual’s entire life. 
Although trust may still decrease drastically as a result of a traumatic experience, it tends to 
remain stable through time and is mostly immune to the individual’s experiences following 
his early upbringing. This theory suggests that social trust is part of a broader set of 
personality characteristics that include agreeableness, optimism, and self-satisfaction. Thus, 
for some authors, trust-related survey questions merely reveal the individual’s general 
disposition towards the world, rather than his response to the constantly changing social 
environment that surrounds them. For instance, an optimist might be more naturally inclined 
to trust and cooperate with strangers because of a more developed sense of altruism. 
Pessimists, however, will tend to have more misanthropic personalities and therefore be less 
open to the possibilities of social cooperation and trust. While this theory certainly offers 
compelling insight into the nature of social trust, it has generally failed to gather any kind of 
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empirical support to explain the large variations in attitudinal measurements of social trust 
over the years.  
The second major theory of social trust, also known as the societal approach, sees 
trust as a property of society, rather than a core psychological feature of individuals. 
According to this view, trust is the product of individual experience and is therefore subject to 
change, as we constantly modify or update our feelings in response to changing social, 
political, or economic circumstances. This view describes trust as a malleable resource that is 
perpetually being redefined by individuals who react to the world that surrounds them. Thus, 
rather than capturing individual inclinations, trust-related survey questions actually inform us 
of how respondents assess the trustworthiness of society. For this reason, the levels of social 
trust reported in surveys tell us more about the quality of social systems rather than the 
personality types of those living in them. This interpretation of trust is more credible than the 
previous one for two reasons. First, it offers a compelling explanation for the wide variations 
in trust-related survey results throughout history. Second, it is also more plausible due to the 
fact that individuals living in wealthy and democratic countries systematically report higher 
levels of social trust, compared to their counterparts living in less developed communities.  
The societal approach is further divided into two additional branches, namely the civil 
society and institutional models. The civil society model claims that social trust is a product 
of voluntary association and participation in collective organizations, which facilitate 
repeated social interactions between individuals (Putnam 1993; Dinesen 2012; Glanville and 
Paxton 2007). It is interesting to note that the idea that social trust depends on participation in 
public interest organizations can also be found in the works of several political theorists as 
early as the first half of the 19th century. Indeed, thinkers such as Tocqueville or Mill argued 
that successful democratic societies could only be built by encouraging participation in 
voluntary organizations in the local community. They also believed that direct, sustained, 
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face-to-face involvement in community governance would strengthen social bonds and thus 
help people understand the value of cooperation and acknowledge the importance of pursuing 
the common good, rather than their own selfish interests. From this perspective, increasing 
internal levels of social trust would require creating public structures to facilitate direct 
individual interaction at the local level. However, empirical evidence in support of the trust-
generating qualities of civil society is limited, especially when taking into account the 
problem of reverse causality (Bekkers 2012; Claibourn and Martin 2000; Stolle 2001). As 
such, survey research only shows a weak and intermittent association between membership of 
voluntary organizations and willingness to express trust. In fact, even in the most developed 
countries, the statistical association between social trust and associational membership is 
small (Torcal and Montero 1996; Dekker and van den Broek 1996; Newton 1999). This 
model can also be considered obsolete since that the characteristics of voluntary associations 
have changed greatly since the 19th and early 20th century. For example, most modern 
advocacy organizations extend far beyond the local sphere and the vast majority of their 
members never actually meet.  
Due to the empirical shortcomings of the civil society model, scholars began to focus 
on the institutional determinants of social trust. This view attempts to identify the various 
ways in which formal political and legal institutions can affect social trust, both directly and 
indirectly. This model has inspired numerous compelling causal mechanisms, some of which 
deserve to be mentioned. For example, some authors argue that the creation of an inclusive 
democratic framework, which gives all individuals equal opportunities to express their views 
and participate in the decision-making process, could mitigate social distrust (Ljiphart 1999). 
Other have suggested that political trust is beneficial for the development of social trust 
because politicians and representatives of public institutions act as role models for ordinary 
citizens who tend to modify their behavior in accordance with their perception of political 
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elites (Yamagish and Yamagishi 1994; Brehm and Rahn 1997; Rothstein 2003). Lastly, 
another group of scholars claims that, by providing high-quality public services and proper 
development infrastructures, governments can create more “winners” (i.e. people with higher 
incomes and more stable jobs), who tend to express higher levels of trust in comparison to the 
“losers” (i.e. people living in a precarious economic situation). Having more “winners” 
relative to “losers” in society would ultimately lead to a decrease in economic inequalities 
and social fractionalization, which in turn would allow people to better identify with the 
struggles of their fellow citizens (Knack and Keefer 1997; Zak and Knack 2001; Uslaner 
2002). Therefore, it seems that the institutional model of social trust has produced some of 
the most convincing theoretical arguments compared to the previous theories of social trust.  
 
Table 1: Theories of Social Trust and Related Variables 
 
Theories Variables 





Optimism, agreeableness, primary 
socialization 
 
Societal approaches  
 




Membership in voluntary organizations 
 
Democracy, economic equality and well-


















This chapter develops the main theoretical argument that explains how formal institutions can 
affect a community’s internal levels of social trust. In this thesis, I focus on one of the various 
possible determinants of social trust, namely the quality of contemporary political and legal 
institutions (i.e. formal institutions). The theoretical mechanism that I describe in this section 
aligns with the institutional approach to the formation of social trust. I use insights from the 
field of psychology in order to better understand individual decision-making processes. Thus, 
I argue that people use the quality of their country’s formal institutions to infer the 
trustworthiness of other members of their community. For instance, fair, efficient, and 
transparent state institutions (i.e. judiciary, parliament, executive government etc.) provide 
important cues, or signals, about the norms – and therefore the trustworthiness – of the people 
who are governed by them.  
 This theoretical argument is based on the concept of heuristics. In psychology, 
heuristics are simple strategies, or rules-of-thumb, that people use to form judgments and 
make decisions when confronted with complex problems. Simon argues that heuristics are 
useful because human judgments suffer from bounded rationality, meaning that they are 
always limited by available information, time constraints, and cognitive deficiencies (1982). 
Similarly, Tversky and Kahneman also demonstrate that people tend to follow heuristic 
decision-making strategies when their ability to acquire information is limited (1974). For this 
reason, heuristic shortcuts tend to be efficient but not optimal, because they rely on data of 
limited validity and therefore lead to systematic estimation errors, known as cognitive biases. 
Generally, heuristics govern automatic and intuitive judgments, rather than complex and 
elaborate thought processes; however, it is interesting to note that heuristic strategies 
determine how people interact with both the physical and social worlds. For example, people 
are often inclined to estimate the distance of certain objects based solely on their clarity, 
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expecting to see the more distant objects less sharply than nearer ones. I argue that, when it 
comes to social interactions, similar mental shortcuts are also common, as people constantly 
make subjective probabilistic assessments concerning the likelihood of uncertain events, 
including the trustworthiness of their fellow citizens.  
In this thesis, I focus on one particular kind of heuristic, namely representativeness. 
The representativeness heuristic implies that people expect instances (i.e. objects, persons, or 
events) to possess the salient characteristics of the category of which they are members (e.g. 
expecting someone who is a librarian to resemble a prototypical librarian). I suspect that 
representativeness is particularly important when evaluating the trustworthiness of others. 
Indeed, determining the trustworthiness of other people is a complex and lengthy process that 
would normally require a large amount of time and information to be properly completed. 
However, due to some of the aforementioned cognitive and practical limitations, people are 
more likely to automatically determine the probability of someone being trustworthy by 
examining the attributes of the categories with which they are associated. Thus, if a state’s 
formal institutions are corrupt and unfair, one might intuitively expect the state’s citizens to 
display similar features and ultimately choose to be less trusting towards them. 
Representativeness, which is based on a form of associative thinking, also entails that if the 
salient prototypical features of the category (in this case, the state) change, so should the 
people’s attitude towards the instances that are being categorized (in this case, the citizens). 
The goal of this paper is to identify an external shock that leads to a visible improvement in 
the quality of a state’s institutions, which in turn prompts the citizens to readjust their views 
regarding the trustworthiness of others by altering that state’s defining characteristics.  
Therefore, I expect people to adjust their attitude regarding the trustworthiness of 
other people as soon as their perception of the quality of the formal institutions that govern 
them changes. Due to the nature of the representativeness heuristic, this shift should be 
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proportional and immediate. To summarize, the causal chain should work as follows: a visible 
and meaningful variation in institutional quality at the macro-level will lead to an increase in 
institutional trust, as people change their perception of the state’s institutions, which in turn 
should increase their propensity to trust other people. This theoretical mechanism is 
schematically illustrated in Figure 1. Given the particularities of this causal mechanism, the 
people most affected by the variations in institutional quality should be those who have the 
best ability to perceive and appreciate these changes. Thus, the goal of this thesis is to 
measure the differential effect of a major institutional improvement upon groups of 
individuals who possess different characteristics that make them more or less likely to react 
(i.e. modify their attitude towards the world) to such a variation. It is also important to bear in 
mind that if people constantly reassess the trustworthiness of others as institutions develop, 
the institutional improvements that they react to must be palpable and concrete rather than 
superficial. In the case of the treatment used in this paper, this means that it is not the (de 
jure) establishment of the Romanian anticorruption agency that triggers an increase in social 
trust among the population, but rather its (de facto) success in combating corruption by 
indicting high-profile bureaucrats and politicians.  
As mentioned previously, the likelihood to react to variations in institutional quality 
depends on two conditions. First, individuals must be able to perceive the institutional 
improvements as they happen. Perceiving an institutional improvement means cognizing its 
occurrence; in other words, perception refers to the individual’s ability to become aware of 
what is happening in the world. However, one’s mere knowledge of what is happening in 
society is not enough to actually affect one’s behavior. Thus, individuals must also be able to 
appreciate the institutional improvements as they happen. Appreciating an institutional 
improvement means acknowledging its magnitude and importance; in other words, 
appreciation refers to the individual’s ability to understand why certain events matter – this 
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ability depends on the individual’s level of political knowledge, interest in politics, and 
proximity to the changes that are taking place (i.e. since that will determine the extent to 
which particular events affect the individual’s well-being). In this paper, I seek to capture 
both of these dimensions and therefore compare changes in social trust among respondents 
who were able to not only perceive, but also appreciate a major institutional variation. In 
order to incorporate the aforementioned dimensions, I categorize respondents along three 
broad lines, namely by their proximity to the treatment, political knowledge, and political 
interest. Given the limited amount of data provided by the surveys used in this thesis, the 
most convincing measures of these variables are the following: (1) I use the size of the 
respondent’s city as an indicator of proximity, since the treatment affected only large cities, 
(2) I use the frequency of political news consumption to estimate the effect of political 
knowledge; (3) lastly, I incorporate the respondent’s reported level of interest in politics. This 
























































Figure 1: Theoretical Mechanism Describing Relationship Between Variations in 
Institutional Quality and Generalized Social Trust 
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H1: A variation in a country’s institutional quality will have a stronger effect on the 
evolution of social trust among people who live in urban areas. 
 
First, I predict that urban respondents are more likely to express higher levels of 
social trust in the post-treatment period. This hypothesis is based on the 
assumption that citizens who find themselves in greater proximity to certain 
events are more likely to perceive and appreciate their importance. In this case, 
proximity makes the material damages caused by corruption and the indictments 
of those responsible for them easier to detect. The expectation that urban 
respondents will report a relatively higher level of social trust in the post-
treatment period is motivated by a particularity in the administration of the 
treatment, which affected only large cities and did not concern towns or villages 
(i.e. the anticorruption agency investigated only high rather than petty corruption 
cases and did not hold jurisdiction over small localities). 
 
H2: A variation in a country’s institutional quality will have a stronger effect on the 
evolution of social trust among people who are frequent consumers of political 
news. 
 
Second, I expect frequent consumers of political news to also report higher levels 
of trust in the post-treatment period. Respondents who consume political news 
more frequently are more likely to have better knowledge and understanding of 
politically relevant affairs, such as the indictments of high-profile figures by the 
DNA. Furthermore, given the notoriety of the individuals targeted by the DNA’s 
investigations, their indictments have systematically garnered substantial media 






H3: A variation in a country’s institutional quality will have a stronger effect on the 
evolution of social trust among people who report a higher level of interest in 
politics. 
 
Third, I suspect that individuals who report a higher level of interest in politics 
will also experience an increase in social trust following the introduction of the 
treatment. The mechanism connecting these two variables is quite 
straightforward: having a greater interest in politics suggests that the individual is 
equipped with the necessary conceptual tools to appreciate the importance of the 



































IV. Historical Background and Evaluation of Treatment  
 
 
4.1 Preliminary Observations 
 
 
In the previous section, I have provided an in-depth account of my theoretical framework; I 
now turn towards the more practical dimensions of my study and discuss the treatment used 
in this thesis. Traditional experimental approaches to the study of social trust are difficult to 
carry out for both logistical and ethical reasons. Indeed, controlling for cultural variables, 
such as social trust, and assigning treatments at the institutional level are two practically 
impossible endeavors. Using historical institutional variations in quasi-experimental 
frameworks is therefore a compelling, albeit imperfect, alternative to large-scale experimental 
designs. However, identifying such historical institutional transformations can also be a 
daunting task, since formal institutions tend to be deeply entrenched in society, which means 
that radical institutional overhauls are a fairly rare occurrence. In that sense, Eastern Europe 
represents an ideal place for social scientists in search of appropriate treatments due to the 
massive changes underwent by the countries of this region following the fall of the Soviet 
Union and the subsequent democratization processes that took place throughout the 1990s. In 
this section, I contextualize the unexpected yet meaningful institutional variation (i.e. the 
treatment) whose effect is the focus of this thesis.  
 
4.2  Romania’s Difficult Democratic Transition (1989 – 1996) 
 
 
During the Second World War, Romania tried to remain neutral; however, pressures from 
Moscow and Berlin prompted the Romanian government to join the Axis forces in 1940. 
After the end of the war and the defeat of the Axis, the USSR forced Romania’s monarch, 
King Michael I, to abdicate and leave the country. Thus, in 1947, Romania was proclaimed a 
communist People’s Republic and remained under the direct military and economic control of 
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the USSR until the 1950. In April 1948, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, who was named the First 
Secretary of the Romanian Worker’s Party and remained the leader of Romania until 1965, 
managed to persuade the Soviet First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev to withdraw troops from 
Romania. Following Gheorghiu-Dej’s death in 1965, his successor, Nicolae Ceaușescu, who 
was appointed as the new General Secretary of the Communist Party (i.e. PCR), began to 
progressively push for more authoritarian measures and pursue several unpopular policies that 
lasted until his regime’s demise in 1989. In December 1989, a series of violent civil protests 
precipitated the fall of Romania’s Communist regime, culminating in the show trial and 
execution of Nicolae Ceaușescu and his wife Elena. Despite the temporary euphoria of the 
Revolution, the chaos caused by the abrupt collapse of the regime had a profound and lasting 
effect on Romania’s political landscape and society. In the aftermath of the Revolution, a new 
political structure, the National Salvation Front (i.e. FSN), came to power. The FSN, which 
was formed at the initiative of some of Ceaușescu’s plotting generals, welcomed several 
former members of the Communist Party, a group which included the party’s leader, Ion 
Iliescu. By using the media to launch attacks against their political opponents, the FSN 
managed to rapidly seize control of the main institutions of the state. Once the confusion of 
the Revolution had dissipated, the FSN organized the first free elections in the country’s 
modern history, winning the presidential elections on 20 May 1990, while also obtaining a 
majority in both the Assembly of Deputies and the Senate. Despite the fact that over 200 
political parties were formed in the years following the Revolution, the FSN was by far the 
most well established platform, benefitting from both massive popular support and the 
admiration of foreign leaders. 
The first stage of Romania’s democratic transition was, however, more problematic 
than in most post-communist countries. Indeed, Romania’s early democratic experience was a 
blend of authoritarianism and paternalism, held together by various processes that sought to 
																																																																																																																																																Baconschi 29	
maintain the bureaucracy in positions of economic and institutional power, while also 
diminishing the political influence of the opposition (Gussi 2007). Furthermore, the 
development of a powerful alliance between the members of the state bureaucracy, who were 
either associated with the recently-formed FSN or former members of the PCR, and the new 
business elite, who managed to secure key public contracts in the aftermath of the Revolution, 
resulted in the establishment of a new informal nomenklatura (Deletant 1998). Even after the 
dissolution of the FSN and the development of democratic pluralism, the concentration of 
economic and political power in the hands of a small nucleus of elites remained a defining 
feature of Romania’s political landscape. This unique transitional phase – and the outcomes 
associated to it – was largely dominated by the figure of the FSN’s first leader, Ion Iliescu. 
Iliescu, who had gained a respectable amount of political legitimacy in the post-communist 
period, both due to his electoral victories and to the extensive territorial presence of his party, 
spearheaded most of Romania’s early reforms (Tismăneanu 1998). Furthermore, until 1996, 
Iliescu was able to cater to the fears of Romania’s industrial workers and peasants who lived 
in less developed regions, meaning that his popular appeal allowed him to preserve a structure 
of power that was highly reminiscent of Ceaușescu’s authoritarian formula. Thus, the state of 
affairs that characterized Romania in the first half of the 1990 decade led some political 
thinkers to qualify it as Neo-Bolshevism, or Neo-Communism: a strong charismatic leader, 
surrounded by a dense bureaucratic network with ties to the growing private sector. 
Tismăneanu aptly summarizes the main characteristics of Romania’s early transition phase: 
 
“Ion Iliescu’s regime symbolized Romanian communism’s afterlife: a 
syncretic combination of simulated pluralism and residual Leninism, lip 
service to democratic values and nostalgia for bureaucratic authoritarianism 
[…] add to this the tentacular growth of economic mafias protected by 
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government institutions. Instead of a market democracy, post-Ceașescu 
Romania was a kleptocratic regime with a pluralist façade”. (1997, 22) 
 
4.3  Economic Reforms, Persistence of Corruption, and Early Attempts to 
Combat Corruption (1996 – 2002) 
 
 
In 1996, the results in local elections signaled a major shift in the political orientation of the 
Romanian electorate, as opposition parties swept most of the country’s major cities, including 
the capital, Bucharest. The trend continued in the same year’s legislative and presidential 
elections, in which Iliescu’s PDSR (i.e. a party formed in 1992 after the FSN split due to 
internal disputes and political tensions) lost a large share of the rural electorate that had once 
supported his rise to power. The opposition was structured around an electoral alliance, the 
Romanian Democratic Convention (i.e. CDR), which included several center-right political 
parties, namely the Christian Democratic National Peasant’s Party (i.e. PNTCD) as well as 
the National Liberal Party (i.e. PNL). The opposition campaign emphasized two central 
points: implementing economic reforms and reducing corruption. Indeed, Iliescu’s gradualist 
approach to economic reform yielded poor results, which caused great frustration and anxiety 
among a large share of his electorate. Furthermore, the rampant corruption within the entire 
state apparatus was becoming more visible, which upset people who sought to move away 
from the legacy of the communist regime. Thus, while Romanian voters did not have a 
credible alternative to Iliescu during the first post-communist years, the newly formed CDR 
offered them a new and long awaited democratic option.  
Although Romania had three different prime ministers in the years that followed 
CDR’s historical electoral victory, the governing parties preserved their coalition. However, 
due to mounting internal tensions and economic hardship brought by structural reforms, 
popular dissatisfaction with the CDR’s governance surged, which allowed the Social 
Democratic Party (i.e. PSD, a new party resulting from the fusion of the PDSR with a smaller 
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socialist platform known as the PSDR) to come back to power in 2000. Thanks to the 
leadership of Prime Minister Adrian Năstase and the reforms undertaken by the CDR, 
Romania entered a period of relative prosperity, consistently experiencing high rates of 
economic growth and political stability. Furthermore, the Năstase government continued to 
pursue pro-Western foreign policy, which eventually led to Romania’s joining NATO and 
signing the accession treaty to join the EU in the spring of 2004. Romania’s economic 
success and progressive diplomatic expansion also facilitated the rise of an active civil society 
that began demanding more transparency and accountability from state institutions and their 
representatives. Progressively, the public’s focus shifted from economic reform to judicial 
reform: as the market economy finally started bearing fruit, the state’s democratic institutions 
needed to be tinkered with next.  
 Romania’s early problem with high-level corruption is difficult to overstate. 
Throughout the 1990s, Romania’s political landscape was shaken by a series of high profile 
corruption scandals that had massive repercussions upon the country’s development. In order 
to better grasp the magnitude and consequences of Romania’s high-level corruption, it might 
be useful to provide some concrete examples of cases that the country had to confront before 
reforming its legal system. One of the most infamous scandals that took place in Romania 
during the 1990s involved Bancorex, which used to be the country’s largest public bank and 
one of the main pillars of its developing economy. Due to its non-performing loan portfolio 
and despite the state’s attempt to recapitalize it, the bank was forced to declare bankruptcy. 
The bank’s poor performance was directly related to behind-the-scenes political dealings and 
corruption, which ultimately cost the state over $2 billion – a sum that represented 
approximately 7% of Romania’s GDP at that time. Today, the Bancorex fiasco is remembered 
as one of the most powerful symbols of the oligarchic state that Romania was turning into 
after the Revolution (Gallagher 2005). Another corruption scandal that had a lasting effect on 
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Romanian society involved a contract issued by the Ministry of Defense to buy 
communications equipment from the American telecommunications company Motorola for 
$6 million, a price that was ten times more expensive than the actual value of equipment 
(Dana 2006). Romania’s post-communist transition was plagued by many other similar 
corruption cases that involved officials at the highest level of the state. Despite receiving 
tremendous media attention, most of these cases did not result in any indictments due to the 
absence of proper judicial structures. 
Romania’s early anti-corruption efforts were feeble and disappointingly ineffective. 
Despite the government’s attempts to bring Romania closer to the international community, 
little was done to combat internal corruption. In fact, Năstase himself was later convicted for 
taking bribes, blackmailing political adversaries, and misusing public funds to support his 
campaign. The only meaningful anticorruption measure that was carried out during the 
Năstase years was the creation of the National Anticorruption Prosecution Office (i.e. PNA), 
a specialized agency tasked with investigating and prosecuting politicians – and other persons 
who exercise a significant degree of influence in society – for corruption-related offenses that 
caused material damage to the Romanian state (e.g. bribery, graft, patronage, and 
embezzlement). More specifically, the PNA was established in 2002 by the Emergency 
Ordinance No. 43/2002 of the Romanian Government with the purpose of combating all 
kinds corruption offences that caused important prejudice to the Romania state’s institutions 
or to its economic interests (PNA Activity Report 2003). The establishment of the PNA 
represents an important part of Romania’s modern history because it was the first institutional 
structure that was exclusively tasked with tackling corruption. However, the PNA was not 
given the necessary tools to properly accomplish its highly ambitious mission: not only were 
its objectives were vaguely defined, but the boundaries of its power were also unclear, which 
in turn often pushed the PNA in the territory of questionable constitutionality (DNA Report 
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2005). For these reasons, in the first years of its existence, the PNA was relatively ineffective 
in combatting corruption: only 10% of the cases investigated by the agency resulted in 
criminal proceedings – an improvement by Romanian standards, but an insufficiently large 
one in the eyes of Romania’s foreign partners (European Commission Report to the European 
Parliament and Council 2007). Therefore, the creation of the PNA was initially perceived as a 
positive yet superficial response to Romania’s growing corruption problem on behalf of the 
government.  
 
4.4  Judicial Reforms and the Birth of the National Anticorruption Directorate 
(2005 – present)  
 
 
Romania’s most meaningful judicial improvement came after the end of Năstase’s mandate, 
when the PNA was completely revamped and reinvigorated between the end of 2005 and the 
beginning of 2006. Before providing a more detailed look at the transformation underwent by 
the PNA, however, it might be helpful to first identify the main driving forces that led to the 
implementation of this reform. Broadly speaking, the events that took place in Romania’s in 
the post-Năstase era were influenced by three main factors, namely foreign pressure, the 
general public’s enthusiasm for anticorruption measures, and the synergy of a handful of 
politicians who actively pursued reform.  
First, after signing the EU accession treaty in 2004 and being scheduled to join the 
Union as part of the 2007 enlargement wave, Romania began facing tremendous pressure 
from European Institutions and Member States to bring its institutions to EU standards in 
terms of transparency, integrity, and internal monitoring (European Commission Report to the 
European Parliament and Council 2007). In fact, the fight against corruption represented one 
of the most important fields monitored by the European Commission; for this reason, starting 
with 2005, Romania was targeted by a special safeguard clause that allowed the EU to 
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postpone the country’s accession for another year, if deficiencies regarding Romania’s 
anticorruption performance had been identified.  
Second, the reform of the PNA was also made possible by the general public’s support 
for anticorruption measures following the previous government’s feeble response to the 
country’s corruption problem. Indeed, in 2004, after four years of PSD-led government, the 
mounting public support for anticorruption measures allowed the political tide shifted in favor 
of a new center-right electoral alliance, the Truth and Justice Alliance (i.e. DA), which was 
composed of the recently formed Democratic Party (i.e. PD) and the National Liberal Party 
(i.e. PNL). As implied by its symbolically meaningful name, the DA was a platform whose 
two main political priorities were the fight against corruption and the establishment of a non-
political judiciary system. According to Theodor Stolojan, the president of one of the two 
parties forming the alliance, the DA was created as a vehicle for coordinating opposition 
efforts against the PSD’s alleged corruption, he stated in an interview: “we want the alliance 
to set us free from corruption and lies” (Lungescu 2006). The popularity of the DA message 
allowed the platform to achieve two major electoral victories in 2004: not only did it manage 
to propel Traian Băsescu, a charismatic former merchant marine deck officer and mayor of 
Bucharest, to the presidency, but it also secured a strong presence in the Parliament. 
Lastly, Romania also benefitted from the extraordinary efforts of a class of political 
leaders who made the fight against corruption their top priority, despite the protests of the 
PSD-led opposition. As such, Băsescu and his allies dedicated their efforts to combating high-
level corruption by pursuing structural reforms. Băsescu’s desire to reduce corruption in view 
of Romania’s adhesion to the EU was carried out by one pivotal figure of his cabinet, namely 
his first Minister of Justice, Monica Macovei, who held the office between 2004 and 2007. 
Thanks to Băsescu’s robust support, Macovei managed to almost single-handedly transform 
the relatively feeble PNA into the highly performing anticorruption watchdog that it is today. 
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However, the implementation of Macovei’s reform project did not go smoothly and was 
heavily criticized by the opposition. Thus, the Emergency Ordinance No. 134/2005, through 
which the PNA was going to be reorganized into the DNA and allowed to focus its activity 
exclusively on high level corruption cases, was initially rejected by the Senate of Romania on 
February 9th 2006. The Ordinance reentered the Parliamentary debate only after the President 
decided to get involved and demanded the Parliament to reexamine it. After a few 
modifications, the Ordinance was finally approved by the Parliament in March later that year.  
Table 2 summarizes the most important elements of Romania’s post-communist history, 
leading up to the creation of the DNA and the judicial reforms of the early 2006. 
Overall, the treatment around which this thesis revolves appears to be the product of a 
set of individual decisions taken in the right circumstances. Thus, the introduction and 
efficiency of the DNA both seem to be independent from the outcome trend itself. In fact, in 
the eyes of several political commentators, the DNA is described like a fortunate accident 
rather than the inevitable conclusion of Romania’s development during the post-communist 
period. This is made particularly clear when the case of Romania’s fight against corruption is 
contrasted with Bulgaria’s failure to achieve similar results. After the collapse of the Eastern 
Bloc, Romania and Bulgaria shared highly similar development trajectories in terms of 
economic growth, democratization, and corruption. Furthermore, Bulgaria also benefitted 
from the same window of opportunity as Romania, since it also joined the EU in 2007 and 
was tasked with reforming its legal system in order to clean up corruption. Despite going 
through a comparable democratization process and being subject to the same foreign pressure, 
Bulgaria has not developed any anticorruption institution with the same effectiveness as the 
DNA. Bulgaria’s public support for anticorruption measures has amounted to nothing more 
than the creation of numerous superficial agencies that held no real power. The fact that the 
Bulgarian Parliament has repeatedly opposed the introduction of a specialized unit tasked 
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with tackling high-level corruption proves that the country’s failure to reduce corruption is 
mostly due to the absence of a political will to implement reform, rather than the lack of 
means. To quote the words of Bulgaria’s ex-Minister of Justice, Hristo Ivanov: “unless you 
have decisive action to investigate and punish corruption, particularly at the highest level, we 
are not going to see any dramatic change in institutional culture like we are seeing in 
Romania” (Macdowall 2016). Ivanov’s concerns are also reflected in the numbers: according 
to Transparency International, an international anticorruption think tank, Romania was ranked 
85th in the world in terms of corruption, while Bulgaria was 55th in 2005; however, in 2017, 
Romania was ranked 59th and Bulgaria 71st.  
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4.5  Characteristics and Results of the National Anticorruption Directorate 
 
 
So far, I have described the context in which the reform of the PNA occurred. I dedicate this 
subsection to providing additional details regarding the jurisdiction, structure, power, and 
activity of the newly formed DNA. As mentioned earlier, the years 2005 and 2006 were 
crucial for Romania’s justice system: following the Parliament’s approval of the Emergency 
Ordinance No. 134/2005 of the Romanian Government in 2006, the former National 
Anticorruption Prosecution Office was reorganized to create the National Anticorruption 
Directorate, a new specialized autonomous structure, possessing its own legal personality, 
having an independent budget, and being attached to the High Court of Cassation and Justice. 
All the information provided below (i.e. including numbers and legal documents) is taken 
from the DNA’s publicly available annual activity reports.  
Jurisdiction. The Emergency Ordinance modified the dispositions regarding the 
DNA’s jurisdiction so that this new structure could deal only with high rather than petty 
corruption cases. Therefore, the DNA can investigate any corruption case if the one who 
commits the crime falls into one of the following categories: public officials (e.g. members of 
parliament, ministers, senators etc.), legal practitioners (e.g. judges of the High Court of 
Cassation and Justice and the Constitutional Court etc.), financial controllers (e.g. 
commissioners of the Financial Guard, customs staff etc.), military and police officers (e.g. 
generals, admirals etc.), and the heads of other central public authorities. The Emergency 
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Ordinance also raised the financial threshold of the prejudice caused as a result of the 
corruption offences investigated by the DNA from €100,000 to €200,000, and the one 
regarding the object of traditional bribe offences was increased from €5,000 to €10,000. 
Second, the DNA’s jurisdiction was extended to cover all the offences against the financial 
interests of the European Union (regardless of the value of the damage), as well as the 
offences of macroeconomic significance that caused material damage higher than €1,000,000. 
Interestingly, however, the DNA’s jurisdiction was also restricted as a result of reconsidering 
the nature and importance of the offender’s function; as such, the leaders of public authorities 
and institutions from towns and villages, as well as all the persons with control attributions 
within them, such as police agents, public notaries, and judicial executors, were excluded 
from the DNA’s jurisdiction. This means that the DNA was given the responsibility to deal 
exclusively with the most important and visible cases of high-level corruption, which took 
place in large cities, where all of the state’s central institutions are located.  
Structure. The organizational model of the DNA was inspired by similar structures 
existing in countries such as Norway and Belgium. The DNA is composed of a central 
structure that governs multiple smaller units (i.e. 15 territorial services and 3 territorial 
offices) that are implanted across the Romanian territory. The DNA’s command structure 
gravitates around a Chief-Prosecutor and two deputies, all of which are nominated by the 
Minister of Justice and appointed by the President, hence the importance of Băsescu and 
Macovei’s political partnership. The DNA can be notified from multiple sources, including 
citizens (i.e. complaints, denouncements, self-denouncements), companies, or public 
authorities; however, the DNA can also take notice from its own prosecutor’s work or from 
information published in the media.  
Power. It is worth noting that the DNA’s capacity for action was also enhanced 
through the Government Decision No. 655/2006, which significantly increased the agency’s 
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number of available prosecutors, specialists, and auxiliary personnel. The DNA also 
benefitted from the development and rapid implementation of a centralized IT network that 
connected the DNA’s headquarters to all the territorial offices, thus facilitating 
communications between the agency’s branches and departments. Additionally, thanks to 
various legislative measures as well as a rigorously applied working methodology, the DNA 
managed to ensure that the activity of its prosecutors would be carried out independently 
from the influences of their hierarchical superiors or other external actors. Lastly, the 
professionalism and competence of the DNA’s first prosecutors also played an important part 
in explaining the agency’s early success. For instance, the DNA’s first Chief Prosecutor, 
Daniel Morar, was a pivotal figure in Romania’s fight against corruption since he began re-
opening files that had previously been closed by the former PNA management. Among the 
files re-opened by Morar was the famous Năstase case, which resulted in the ex-Prime 
Minister being sentenced to prison in 2012. 
Results. The first concrete results of the DNA’s fight against corruption came almost 
immediately after the agency was reformed in early 2006. The activity of the DNA’s 
prosecutors resulted in the initiation of multiple investigations in major cases of political 
corruption, including cases related to large frauds in public procurements, privatizations and 
leasing of goods from the public domain, or corruption of the judicial system. Furthermore, 
during 2006, DNA prosecutors also investigated and sent to trial an unprecedented number of 
present and former members of Parliament, Ministers and State Secretaries, high officials of 
local public administrations, leaders of major governmental structures, magistrates, and other 
figures from across the political spectrum. Thus, during 2006, out of the 2615 cases that the 
DNA had to solve, 1092 were solved; the defendants were sent to trial in 127 cases, resulting 
in 127 indictments, for a total prejudice of 170 million RON. Similarly, in 2007, out of the 
3,319 cases that the DNA had to solve, 2,070 were solved; the defendants were sent to trial in 
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167 cases, resulting in 167 indictments for a total prejudice of 386 million RON. In both 
years, over half of the defendants sent to trial had important positions of power and influence. 
Over the course of the following years, these numbers have continued to increase: for 
example, the DNA indicted 1,250 public officials for high-level corruption crimes in 2015 
alone, while also sending to trial 1 Prime Minister, 5 Ministers, 16 Deputies, and 5 Senators. 
In 2016, the DNA set a new record by achieving a 90% conviction rate for the officials who 
were under investigation, a percentage that surpasses most other European states. As opposed 
to the PNA, the DNA also began investigating a greater number of politically connected 
figures, as illustrated by Figure 2. This figure clearly showcases the DNA’s aggressive focus 
on fighting corruption at the highest level.  
 






Furthermore, the DNA has also been exemplary in terms of reporting, as it continuously 
showed high degrees of openness and transparency. The effectiveness of the DNA in 
combating corruption has been noticed both domestically (e.g. according to a survey 
conducted by INSCOP Research, the trust of Romanians in the DNA is high – 59.8% – in 
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comparison with other institutions such as the Parliament – 12.6% - or the Government – 
22.6%) as well as internationally. In the 2014 Anti-corruption Report, the European 
Commission stated:  
 
“DNA has built a notable track record of non-partisan investigations and 
prosecutions into allegations of corruption at the highest levels of politics 
[…] in the past seven years, the DNA has indicted over 4,700 defendants […] 
nearly 1,500 defendants were convicted through final court decisions, almost 
half of them holding very high level positions”. (2014, 14) 
 
Furthermore, in 2016, European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker proposed to 
remove the corruption-monitoring scheme that the Commission imposed on Romania when it 
joined the EU in 2007. The so-called Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (i.e. CVM) 
was established to monitor the progress of Romania’s anticorruption reforms. Romania 
received three consecutive positive CVM reports, prompting the Juncker to request the end of 
the Mechanism before 2019 (Păun 2016).   
 
4.6  Evaluating the Treatment  
 
 
The creation of the DNA represents a compelling treatment for three main reasons. First, the 
DNA’s success is a good example of an improvement in the Romanian state’s institutional 
quality (i.e. ability to reduce corruption). Figure 3 illustrates the evolution of Romania’s 
Corruption Perceptions Index (i.e. CPI) from 1997 to 2016. The CPI, which is published on a 
yearly basis by Transparency International, measures the perceived levels of corruption by 
country and year, as determined by expert assessments and opinion surveys. The CPI ranks 
countries on a scale from 100 (i.e. very clean) to 0 (i.e. highly corrupt). Figure 3 shows that 
Romania’s perceived level of corruption continued to rise until 2002-3 (i.e. the CPI falls from 
																																																																																																																																																Baconschi 42	
approximately 34 points in 1997 to 26 in 2002), started decreasing slowly shortly after the 
introduction of the PNA in 2002 (i.e. the CPI rises from 26 points in 2002 to 30 points in 
2005), and then fell drastically after the creation of the DNA (i.e. the CPI rises from 30 points 
in 2005 to 48 in 2016). This curve’s overall trend seems to support the idea that the reforms 
that took place in 2005 played a decisive role in reducing Romania’s internal levels of 
corruption. 
 
Figure 3: Evolution of Romania’s Corruption Perceptions Index from 1997 to 2017 
 
 
Source: Transparency International   
 
 
Second, given the highly public nature of its activity, the existence and success of the 
DNA could technically be perceived by anyone. Indeed, the DNA specializes exclusively in 
the investigation of high-level corruption offences, meaning that it targets visible public 
figures such as ministers, senators, or mayors. Additionally, the DNA’s indictments also tend 
to receive massive media coverage, especially since the agency began issuing its own press 
releases since 2006. In fact, defendants have even accused the DNA of purposefully leaking 
evidence to the media in order to humiliate them and create a climate of fear. Third, the 














involvement and level of competence of its chief prosecutors and reformers, who were 
responding to the pressures coming from EU institutions and Member States.  
The main shortcoming of the treatment is the following one: theoretically, it is still 
plausible to assume that the activity of the DNA actually had a negative effect on the 
evolution of social trust in Romania. One could argue that by revealing to the general public 
the widespread corruption that affected the state’s institutions, the indictment of high-profile 
political figures would ultimately prompt people (who were previously underestimating the 
extent of corruption in Romania) to become less trusting. In the case of Romania, however, 
this is outcome is rather unlikely since the DNA’s indictments did not unearth a reality that 
would have otherwise remained hidden. In fact, Romanians were well aware of the increasing 
levels of corruption that affected their country’s institutions before the establishment of the 
anticorruption agency. Thus, rather than being an unpleasant revelation, the DNA’s success 
was most likely perceived as a long-awaited step in the right direction for the country. As 
shown in Figure 3, the CPI, which is partly based on opinion surveys, clearly indicates that 
Romanians were worried about their country’s growing corruption problem as early as 1997. 
In fact, scandals of political corruption were rather frequent in the press, but most of them had 
no judicial follow-up, due to the absence of proper institutional structures charged with 
fighting corruption. Furthermore, according to the results of the Public Opinion Barometer 
published by the Institute for Public Policy, a Romanian think tank, in 2000, 52% of 
Romanians believed that most of corrupt individuals operate among the highest levels of 
public administration, while only 7% claimed that most corruption happens at street-level 
bureaucracy. Therefore, it seems clear that Romanians were already exposed to and aware of 





V. Research Design 
 
 
5.1  Methodological Obstacles 
 
 
I now turn to the main focus of this paper, which is to analyze empirically the relationship 
between a strong variation in institutional quality and the evolution of social trust among 
different groups of respondents. This section offers a detailed outline of the empirical 
strategy, including its structure, scope, advantages, and shortcomings. The study of this 
research question faces several major methodological difficulties that cannot be overlooked. 
Some of these difficulties stem from the nature of social trust itself. Indeed, trust is a cultural 
variable that is deeply entrenched in society, meaning that virtually every kind of social 
interaction, from the most basic to the most complex, has in it an element of trust, which 
makes identifying its determinants a particularly difficult task. Thus, the first obstacle that 
arises in the study of social trust is endogeneity, as the pervasiveness of trust in the social 
world inevitably complicates any attempts to isolate the causal effects of explanatory 
variables. This issue is particularly meaningful when it comes to the relationship between 
trust and the quality of formal institutions, in which case bi-directional causality is not only 
theoretically plausible, but also empirically justified (Knack 2002). The second problem that 
arises when investigating the origins of social trust corresponds to the presence of potentially 
confounding variables. Once again, it is perfectly plausible to assume that the variations in 
both social trust and institutional quality are caused by a set of unknown variables, which 
could lead to interpretation errors. Third, it is important to bear in mind that isolating the 
effect of the treatment itself is also difficult since the gaps between all survey waves are large 
(i.e. at least four years); for instance, there are several other events that occurred in Romania 
during the 1999 – 2006 period, besides the creation and reform of the DNA, which could 
have impacted the evolution of social trust. Lastly, the empirical strategy used in this paper 
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does not differentiate between the effect of the existence or creation of the anticorruption 
agency and the outcomes produced by this institution. Therefore, the results cannot be 
interpreted as evidence of causality.  
 
5.2 Outline of Empirical Strategy 
 
 
In this paper, I draw upon the difference-in-difference method and use quasi-experimental 
research design to measure the differential effect of an exogenous variation in institutional 
quality among different groups of the Romanian population. I perform multivariate linear 
regression analysis of cross-sectional survey data collected by the World Values Survey and 
the European Values Survey that span the pre and post-DNA periods in order to assess 
whether Romania’s successful anticorruption efforts had any positive effect on internal levels 
of generalized and institutional trust. Given the fact that the dependent variables are 
dichotomous, I use a linear probability model to estimate the respondent’s propensity to trust 
other people and institutions. Generally, traditional difference-in-difference design is 
executed by performing a comparison between a treatment and control group at two different 
points in time. It is important to note, however, that causal identification is particularly 
difficult in this case because all individuals living in Romania have technically benefitted 
from the creation and subsequent success of the DNA. However, despite the absence of 
proper treatment and control groups, certain categories of the population were better equipped 
to perceive and appreciate the scope and value of the DNA’s judicial activity, which makes 
this paper’s comparative approach more convincing.  
In order to estimate the causal effect of a treatment with the difference-in-difference 
method, three assumptions must hold, namely exchangeability, stable unity treatment value, 
and positivity. Exchangeability requires the treatment to be unrelated to the outcome at 
baseline. In the case of this thesis, this assumption holds true, since the allocation of the 
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treatment does not seem to be determined the outcome, as I have argued in the previous 
chapter. The stable unity treatment value assumption requires the composition of the 
treatment and comparison groups to be stable for repeated cross-sectional design. This 
assumption also holds true given the sampling method used by the researchers who carried 
out the WVS and EVS surveys in Romania (i.e. see section 5.3 Data and Sampling Method 
for a more detailed account of how the sample groups were created). Lastly, positivity implies 
that the treatment and control groups have parallel trends in the outcome variable. Indeed, the 
parallel trends assumption implies that the pre-treatment trends in the comparison subgroups 
would have continued to progress at the same pace in the absence of treatment. For instance, 
this means that the difference in the evolution of social trust among urban and rural 
individuals in the years leading up to the creation of the DNA should be constant. Although 
there is no statistical test for this assumption, visual inspection can reveal the existence of 
parallel trends when there are enough time points. In the case of this research, the parallel 
trends assumption can only be verified for the first and third hypotheses (i.e. urban v. rural 
divide; high v. low interest in politics), since data concerning frequency of news 
consumptions is missing for two out of three pre and post-treatment survey waves.  
 Formally, the effect of the treatment on the evolution of social trust among 
respondents based on their geographic location (and frequency of news consumption or 





Where Yit,	the	outcome	variable,	is the respondent’s reported level of generalized or 
institutional trust, indexed by individual i and time period t. The variable treatment is a 
dummy that takes the value of 0 for the years preceding the treatment (i.e. 1993, 1998, 1999, 
and 2005) and 1 for all the years that followed the treatment (i.e. 2008, and 2012). The 
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variable urban is also a dummy, which indicates the size of the respondent’s city, taking the 
value of 0 for respondents living in a rural setting and 1 for respondents living in urban ones. 
The interaction between the two dummy variables captures the main effect of interest, which 
is the effect of being interviewed after the treatment took place moderated by the size of the 
respondent’s city. In the fixed effects models, I add the constants αr and αt to capture the 
time-invariant effects of the region and survey year on the outcome variable. I run identical 
regression models that include the other two variables of interest, namely the frequency of 
news consumption and political interest. According to my theory, I expect the coefficients of 
these three interactions to be positive. The fully specified regression model incorporates a set 
of control variables that I will briefly describe and discuss in the following subsection of the 
chapter. Lastly, I perform a series of robustness tests in order to verify whether the results of 
my initial models are consistent.  
Regarding the four main methodological obstacles mentioned in the previous 
subsection, I manage to partially mitigate the effects of bi-directional causality by using a 
unique variation in institutional quality embodied by the DNA, whose reform and success 
were independent from the evolution of social trust and rather caused by exogenous factors, 
such as the enlargement of the EU and the pressure to reform that was exercised by the 
Member States. Thus, I expect to capture the differential effect of this variation by measuring 
the interaction effect between the treatment variable and the dummies of the comparison 
groups. Furthermore, in order to limit the issues caused by confounding variables and 
improve the robustness of the models, I implement a wide variety of control variables in my 
models that I interact with the treatment dummy. I provide a more detailed account of all 
these control variables in the last subsection of this chapter. The models with interactive 
controls are presented in the robustness test subsection of the following chapter. Third, the 
issue caused by the limited number of survey waves cannot be effectively solved, however, as 
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the institutional development of Eastern Europe continues, future researchers will be able to 
observe certain trends over longer periods of time and therefore offer a more detailed account 
of research questions such as the one presented in this paper. Lastly, while distinguishing 
between the effects of the establishment and concrete outcomes of the DNA might be difficult 
empirically, it is likely that any potential improvements in Romania’s internal levels of social 
trust would result from the actual indictments rather than the creation of the institution. 
Indeed, most Romanians failed to acknowledge the significance of the reforms that 
transformed the PNA into the DNA before the first major indictments occurred; in fact, few 
people were aware that the DNA even existed before its outstanding performance caught the 
attention of the media and thus became more visible to the general public.  
 
5.3 Data and Sampling Method 
 
 
Data. I use annual individual cross-sectional survey data on people’s values and beliefs from 
Romania, which covers the period 1993 to 2012 and was assembled by a team of researchers 
on behalf of the World Values Survey (i.e. WVS) and the European Values Survey (i.e. EVS) 
with the help of Metromedia Transylvania. The Romanian team, which was coordinated by 
the Research Institute for Quality of Life of the Romanian Academy for Science, designed the 
research projects, while following the guidelines of the World Values Survey Association. 
Although the two research projects were carried out separately, they both use the same 
questionnaires and sampling methods, which makes it possible to merge the datasets and thus 
expand the temporal scope of the study. Indeed, both surveys were executed in three waves. 
As such, the WVS covers the years 1998, 2005, and 2012, while the EVS covers the years 
1993, 1999, and 2008. Table 3 provides an overview of the two datasets used in this thesis. 
Using WVS and EVS data jointly offers a considerable empirical advantage compared to 
numerous recent studies that explore the origins of social trust by employing two or three-
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wave survey data because it offers a more thorough outline of pre and post-treatment 
attitudinal trends. Furthermore, the timing of the survey waves is also advantageous for the 
purpose of this thesis: as mentioned previously, the DNA was founded in 2006 and began 
prosecuting high-profile politicians soon after, which means that the treatment is 
chronologically situated between the fourth and fifth WVS/EVS survey waves. Nevertheless, 
it is critical to underline that despite the relatively high frequency of WVS and EVS national-
level surveys, isolating the causal effects of single treatment remains incredibly challenging. 
The drawbacks of using these datasets are twofold. First, large-scale surveys are costly and 
lengthy to perform, which means that, more often than not, the timing of the surveys does not 
always align with the treatments, which in turn can hamper causal inference. Second, due to 
the fact that these surveys are conducted at the regional scale, they fail to capture more 
localized variation, which could improve the validity of observational studies. 
Sampling Method. In terms of sampling procedures, the same method was consistently 
applied to create sample groups in every survey year. Thus, the composition of each group 
did not change across surveys. The targeted sample size for every wave is 1,500; the 
population of interest is composed of persons aged 18 – 85 who reside in private households; 
temporary emigrants, foreigners and homeless people were excluded from the surveys. The 
sampling frame is the voting precinct used for local elections. Households were recruited 
using stratified two-stage probability sampling, with stratification in the first stage of the 
primary selection units (i.e. voting districts) proportional to their number of secondary 
selection units (i.e. adults registered on voting lists). The two stratification factors used were 
the socio-cultural area (18 in total) and the type (i.e. level of development) and size of the 
locality. Thus, in the first stage of the sampling process, a sample of voting districts is 
selected by using probability proportional to size method; then, 10 registered electors are 
selected by systemic sampling with equal probabilities from the electoral list of a selected 
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voting district. To adjust for differential response rate and correctly reproduce the population 
structure, the final samples are weighted by age, gender, and locality type. 
 
Table 3: Overview of WVS/EVS Survey Data 
 
Cross-section World Values Survey European Values 
Survey 
No. of waves  3  3 
Years of interview 1993 – 1999 – 2005  1998 – 2008 – 2012  
Observations (all waves) 4518 3577 



























5.4 Operationalization of Main Variables 
 
 
Dependent variable No1 – Generalized trust. The study of generalized social trust entails 
another major difficulty, which is its measurement. Given the difficulty of finding proper 
behavioral measures of social trust, most authors prefer attitudinal measures, in the form of 
standard survey questions that gauge variations in a community’s beliefs and values. Thus, 
the question “Generally speaking would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you 
can’t be too careful in dealing with people?” is often used to determine how people evaluate 
the trustworthiness of the world they live in. In this paper, I measure internal levels of social 
trust by considering the evolution of the share of respondents claiming that “Most people can 
be trusted” in surveys. 
Dependent Variable No2 – Institutional trust. The causal mechanism entailed by the 
theoretical argument of this paper suggests that the treatment should first have a positive 
impact on institutional trust, which would in turn lead to an increase in generalized trust. I 
operationalize institutional trust in two different ways. First, I use a dummy variable that 
indicates the respondent’s reported confidence in the justice system, since the reform of the 
DNA represented an improvement in Romania’s judiciary above anything else. The variable 
takes a value of 0 if respondents do not trust the judiciary and a value of 1 if they do. Second, 
in order to capture the respondent’s trust in their country’s entire institutional framework, 
rather than just the judiciary, I build a simple additive scale based on the respondent’s 
confidence in four different institutions, including the Parliament, the Government, the 
Justice System, and the Police. The scale ranges from 0 (i.e. low trust) to 1 (i.e. high trust). 
Comparison group No1 – Urban v. rural. The urban-rural classification can be 
delineated both in terms of geography as well as population density. While the smallest 
administrative unit reported in WVS and EVS data is the county and not the city, both 
datasets offer quite detailed information regarding the size of the towns in which the 
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interviews took place. Therefore, I create a dummy variable to separate the smallest towns 
from the larger ones. The variable takes the value of 0 if the town has a population of less 
than 50,000 inhabitants and 1 if the town has a population of exceeding 50,000 inhabitants. 
The threshold separating urban and rural communities is justified by the jurisdictional limit 
placed on the DNA through the Emergency Ordinance No. 134/2005, which excludes small 
towns and communes. The values of this variable only indicate the size of the respondent’s 
city in the years, 1993, 1998, 1999, 2005, and 2012, but not 2008. 
Comparison group No2 – Frequent v. infrequent consumer of news. Access to news 
sources represents a crucial condition for the theoretical mechanism described in this paper to 
function as predicted. I create a dummy variable to separate respondents who follow the news 
less than once a week (i.e. 0) from those who follow the news at least once a week (i.e. 1). It 
is important to note that this variable has a large amount of missing values due to the fact that 
the survey question regarding news consumption habits was not asked in every wave. Thus, 
values only illustrate responses in the years 1999 and 2008, the only two waves during which 
the question was asked. The original survey question is formulated as follows: “How often do 
you follows the news?” 
Comparison group No3 – High v. low political interest. Interest in politics is also a 
good indicator of whether the respondent is likely to be affected by the treatment. Therefore, I 
create another dummy variable that takes the value of 0 if the respondent claims not to be 
interested in politics and 1 if the respondent is at least somewhat interested in politics. This 
variable does not suffer from the same missing values issue as the previous one, since the 
voting-related questions were asked during every survey year with the exception of 1999. The 






5.5 Control Variables 
 
 
In order to increase the precision of my estimations, I incorporate several control variables in 
my models. As a robustness check, I interact the control variables with the treatment dummy 
in order to mitigate the effect of potentially confounding factors. The control variables are 
organized into two broad categories, namely socio-economic and personal variables.  
Socio-economic controls. Past research shows that social trust is positively correlated 
with economic well-being as well as higher education levels. Thus, in order to account for 
differences in economic status and education, I include in all my models the respondent’s 
reported income level, which is measured on a 10-point scale (i.e. 1 being the poorest and 10 
the wealthiest), and their education level, which is measured on a 3-point scale (i.e. primary, 
vocational, or university).  
Personal controls. Similar to socio-economic variables, personal and psychological 
factors may also affect the evolution of social trust. First, I add age and gender dummy 
control variables, both of which can also heavily influence an individual’s willingness to trust 
others. Second, I add a dummy variable that indicates the respondent’s marital status. Third, 
given the importance of religion and faith in determining one’s outlook and relation to others, 
I incorporate the respondent’s level of religiosity. In order to simplify the interpretation of the 
this coefficient, I recoded the original religiosity scale, which had the positive responses 
coded as 1 and the negative ones coded as 4, and inverted their values in order to make sure 
that higher values had the same substantive meaning as all the rest of the control variables. 
Thus, religiosity is measured through the question: “How important is religion in your life”, 
with responses ranging from 1 (i.e. not important at all) to 4 (i.e. very important). Although 
other psychological factors, such as happiness and sense of national pride, have been shown 
to affect an individual’s propensity to trust others, several theoretically important controls 
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cannot be incorporated into the models since they are likely to also be directly affected by the 
treatment.  
Year. In order to control for the linear time trend, I add the year variable as a control, 
which silences the variation in the outcome variable that is generated by trust evolving 
linearly over time.  
Fixed effects. Lastly, in order to account for the time-invariant features of Romania’s 
four developmental regions, I include region fixed effects into the models. Additionally, in 
order to pick up variations in the outcome happening over time, I also replicate the regression 





































6.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Table 4 reports the summary for all the main variables. This table is useful because it 
simplifies the detection of any potential issues that could affect the outcome of the regression 
models. In this case, the variables do not seem to suffer from any functional problems. It is 
worth noting that the limited number of observations for some of the variables, such as the 
dummies regarding the frequency of news consumption, is due to the fact that some of the 
survey questions were not asked during every wave. Generally speaking, however, the other 



































	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	
Table 4: Summary 
Statistics of WVS/EVS 
Variables (1990 – 2012) 
No. Obs. Mean Std. Err. Min. Max. 
      
Region 6,767 2.388 1.042 1 4 
Treatment 8,256 0.362 0.481 0 1 
Generalized Trust 8,256 0.164 0.370 0 1 
Institutional Trust  7,930 0.421 0.246 0 1 
Confidence in Judiciary  8,256 0.366 0.482 0 1 
Urban (Dummy) 6,767 0.324 0.468 0 1 
Freq. News (Dummy) 2,635 0.678 0.467 0 1 
Pol. Interest (Dummy) 8,256 0.277 0.448 0 1 
Income Level 6,469 4.499 2.637 1 10 
Education Level 7,019 1.900 0.672 1 3 
Married 8,256 0.653 0.476 0 1 
Religiosity 8,153 3.299 0.840 1 4 
Gender 8,256 1.538 0.499 1 2 
Age 8,256 46.68 17.27 18 97 











Before transitioning to the parallel trends verification and regression analysis of the 
WVS/EVS datasets, I run a series of correlations in order to better understand the relationship 
between the dependent variable, the effect of being interviewed in the pre and post-treatment 
periods, and the influence of the various characteristics by which I categorize respondents. As 
shown in Table 5, I find that being interviewed in the post-treatment period, as well as living 
in an urban environment is negatively correlated with both generalized and institutional trust. 
However, high frequency of news consumption and political interest are positively correlated 
with social trust. It is also interesting to note that all these correlations achieve statistical 
significance, except the dummy that indicates the size of the respondent’s frequency of news 
consumption. The first two results contradict my theory, which argues that people who are 
more capable of perceiving variations in institutional quality will also tend to experience 
greater levels of social trust; however, the final two correlations are consistent with my initial 
predictions. Although these correlations are highly informative, I cannot draw any conclusion 
without analyzing the effect of interacting the treatment variable with each of the 
aforementioned conditions, which will be the focus of the next subsection of this chapter. 
 
Table 5: Correlations Between Different Types of Trust, Treatment Dummy and Explanatory 
Variables (p-values indicate statistical significance) 
 
Type of trust Treatment  
(post) 
Size of city 
(urban) 













































6.2 Verification of Parallel Trends Assumption 
 
 
In this section, I illustrate the evolution of generalized and institutional trust among the 
different categories of respondents before and after the institutional treatment occurred. I 
build a series of graphs that indicate the variations in the share of respondents claiming that 
most people can be trusted among comparison groups for every available survey year. I 
replicate the same graphs illustrating the share of respondents reporting high levels of 
confidence in the judiciary for each comparison group. These figures are useful since they 
facilitate the visual identification of the differential effect of the treatment between 
respondent groups. Furthermore, these figures also allow me to visually verify whether the 
parallel trends assumption holds true in the case of the dummy variables that separate rural 
respondents from urban ones as well as the one indicating the respondent’s level of political 
interest. As mentioned earlier, the parallel trends assumption cannot be verified for the 
dummy of frequency of news consumption, since that variable was only measured in two 
survey waves.  
Figure 4 presents the pair of graphs comparing the evolution of two different kinds of 
social trust among urban and rural respondents before and after the treatment was 
administered. In both cases, the graphs illustrate similar global trends for the two categories 
of respondents. Generally speaking, rural respondents seem to be more trusting than their 
urban counterparts. The differential effect of the treatment is not visible, since generalized 
trust decreases in both comparison groups after the implementation of the judicial reform in 
the period following 2005; however, the urban and rural respondents’ confidence in the 
judiciary experiences a slight increase after 2005. Visual analysis also indicates that the 
parallel trends assumption is violated in both cases, as the differences in social trust between 
the comparison groups are not constant throughout the pre-treatment period. Although visual 
inspection indicates that the difference-in-difference approach can only be imperfectly 
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applied, this method of analysis remains fundamentally limited and the data deserves to be 
explored further through regression models.  
 
Figure 4: Yearly Evolution of Levels of Social Trust among Urban and Rural Respondents 
















Figure 5 presents the same graphs as Figure 4, but comparing respondents based on 
their reported level of interest in politics, rather than the size of their city. The results, 
however, are relatively similar. Although there do not seem to be any differences in either 
generalized or judiciary trust between the comparison groups in the pre-treatment period, both 
categories experience an almost identical variation in the outcome over time. It is interesting 
to note that, once again, the level of generalized trust declines following the treatment period, 
but it does so less steeply among respondents who report greater interest in politics. Similarly, 
the respondents’ confidence in the judiciary increases in both comparison groups, but does so 
more drastically among individuals who are interested in politics. Yet again, the parallel 
trends assumption does not hold; however, in both graphs, the pre-treatment trends in 
reported trust are almost identical in the comparison groups, but diverge after the 
administration of the treatment in 2005 – two observations that support my initial hypotheses. 
























results of the difference-in-difference estimation should be interpreted with caution, but also 
that the treatment’s differential effect might have existed nonetheless.  
 
Figure 5: Yearly Evolution of Levels of Social Trust among Respondents with Different 
Levels of Political Interest (share of respondents saying “most people/justice 

















6.3 Primary Results 
 
 
The descriptive statistics presented in the previous subsection show mixed results. In the 
following subsections, I begin the analysis of the primary empirical results of this paper: I run 
the main linear probability regression models, describe the results, and interpret them by 
referring to my initial theoretical framework. In terms of statistical significance, I seek a 95% 
confidence in my results and therefore set the α threshold at 0.05. Furthermore, I avoid 
heteroskedasticity by calculating robust standard errors. Addressing the issue of spatial 
correlation and accounting for the clustering of the treatment assignment is difficult since the 
WVS/EVS datasets do not provide any information regarding the town or locality in which 
the surveys were conducted; in fact, the smallest administrative unit included in the datasets is 
the county, however, a large share of respondents is only categorized by macro-region. The 
main coefficients of interest that I analyze are the interaction terms between the treatment 
























greater ability to perceive and appreciate the institutional improvement embodied by the 
DNA would also increase the respondent’s propensity to trust other people or institutions. I 
expect the coefficients of the interactions between the treatment variable, the size of the city, 
the frequency of news consumption, and level of political interest to be both positive and 
significant. The regression is structured as follows: first, I regress the dependent variables of 
generalized trust and confidence in the judiciary on the treatment dummy followed by an 
interaction between the treatment and the three key variables by which I categorized 
respondents. I then add control variables sequentially in order to verify whether the results 
remain consistent; I incorporate socio-economic controls, namely Income and Education 
Level, first, and add personal controls, namely Marital Status, Gender, and Age, second. None 
of the models suffer from either multicollinearity or omitted variables, except for the ones 
presented Table 7, in which the main explanatory variable is the frequency of news 
consumption. 
 
6.3.1 Regression for Social Trust and Size of City  
 
 
Table 6 presents six models where I regress the dichotomous variables of confidence in the 
judiciary branch, which is the first and most important indicator of institutional trust, and 
generalized trust on the variables of Treatment and Urban, using the linear probability 
method. Models (1) and (4) only include the Treatment and Urban dummies, as well as their 
interaction coefficient, with no other controls. As mentioned previously, I progressively 
incorporate the two categories of controls, in Models (2) and (5) for socio-economic controls, 
and Models (3) and (6) for personal ones.  
 In my theory, I argue that proximity to the treatment should make it easier for 
individuals to acknowledge an institutional improvement, such as the one embodied by the 
DNA, since they would be better equipped to understand the importance of the indictment of 
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high-profile individuals. In the case of this paper, the comparison between urban and rural 
respondents in particularly meaningful since the DNA’s jurisdictional power encompassed 
only large cities and the high-level officials that operated within them. Thus, I predict the 
urban status of respondents who were surveyed after the treatment has been administered to 
have a positive and significant influence on their propensity to trust both the country’s 
judiciary as well their fellow citizens.  
 The coefficients estimated in Table 6 seem to partly support this paper’s central 
theoretical argument. First, the interaction coefficient between the Treatment and Urban 
dummies is positive in the first three models, which focus on the respondent’s confidence in 
the judiciary; however, the coefficients fail to reach statistical significance and are therefore 
not particularly informative regarding the relationship between the treatment, the 
respondent’s location and confidence in judiciary. Furthermore, the interaction coefficient is 
also positive for the last three models, which hold generalized trust as the dependent variable, 
while also achieving statistical significance at the 0.01 level. This result suggests that living 
in an urban environment (relative to living in a rural one), after the treatment has been 
administered, increases the individual’s propensity to trust others by 6 percent. It is also 
interesting to note that the substantive and statistical significance of the coefficients remains 
relatively stable, as the controls are progressively incorporate in the models. These results 
seem to partly support Hypothesis1, since the interaction coefficient has the expected 
direction. However, the fact that the interaction term fails to reach statistical significance in 
the first three models is rather unexpected, since the theoretical argument presented in this 
paper posits that individuals first update their views on the institutions before heuristically 
deciding whether or not to become more trusting towards other people.  
Lastly, while the effects of the Treatment and Urban dummies are only interesting 
when analyzed in conjunction with one another, it might be interesting to note that both 
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variables have negative and statistically significant individual effects on both types of social 
trust. Similarly, although control variables are not the main element of study of this thesis, it 
should be noted that Income and Education Level have a negative sign throughout the six 
models. Both the size and direction of these coefficients remain consistent within the rest of 










































 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Table 6: Linear 
Regression Models 
for Social Trust and 













Treatment*Urban 0.0369 0.000257 0.00528 0.0666*** 0.0675*** 0.0631*** 
 (0.0291) (0.0308) (0.0305) (0.0187) (0.0200) (0.0200) 
Income Level  -0.00934*** -0.000397  -0.00320 -0.00841*** 
 
 
 (0.00254) (0.00278)  (0.00201) (0.00216) 
Education Level  -0.0176* -0.0450***  -0.00138 0.00817 
  (0.0107) (0.0113)  (0.00839) (0.00890) 
Married   -0.00562   -0.00817 
   (0.0140)   (0.0108) 
Gender   0.00812   -0.0143 
   (0.0131)   (0.0101) 
Age   -0.00141***   0.000173 
   (0.000416)   (0.000322) 
Survey Year   -0.0204***   0.0120*** 
   (0.00255)   (0.00219) 
Constant 0.390*** 0.425*** 41.39*** 0.208*** 0.227*** -23.78*** 
 (0.00818) (0.0205) (5.105) (0.00681) (0.0168) (4.383) 
       
Observations 6,767 5,266 5,264 6,767 5,266 5,264 
R-squared 0.005 0.006 0.022 0.019 0.025 0.032 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 

















6.3.2 Regression for Social Trust and Frequency of News Consumption 
 
 
Table 7 presents six models in which I analyze the relationship between the two main 
dependent variables and the respondent’s frequency of news consumption. The table has the 
same structure as the previous one, with controls being added sequentially in order to test the 
robustness of the interaction term. It might be worth noting that the treatment dummy is 
omitted from the models once the Income Level control is introduced due to collinearity. 
Therefore, I use another relatively compelling, albeit imperfect, proxy for the respondent’s 
economic status, namely the dummy variable Unemployment, which takes the value of 0 if 
the respondent is employed and 1 if he is unemployed.  
 Theoretically, I expect the interaction coefficient between the treatment dummy and 
the respondent’s frequency of news consumption to be both positive and significant since the 
indictments of corrupt high-level figures by the DNA systematically received extensive media 
coverage, which means that individuals who consume more news automatically have greater 
exposure to the DNA’s activity.  
  The results presented in Table 7 are more encouraging relative to the previous one. 
First, it is interesting to note that the interaction term is both positive and statistically 
significant at the 0.05 level across the first three models. Additionally, the substantive size of 
the coefficients is not only quite large, but also remains virtually intact after controls are 
added in Model (3). Thus, according to the fully specified Model (3), being a frequent 
consumer of political news (relative to not being one) after the treatment has been 
administered increases one’s probability to declare a high level of confidence in the justice 
system by 8 percent. Models (4) to (6) are relatively similar: the interaction term between the 
two explanatory variables is positive and its substantive size is stable throughout each of the 
three estimations; however, none of the interaction coefficients achieve statistical 
significance, which complicates their interpretation. 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Table 7: Linear 
Regression Models for 














       
Treatment -0.0430 -0.0283 -0.0298 0.0465** 0.0473** 0.0475** 
 (0.0349) (0.0354) (0.0353) (0.0220) (0.0220) (0.0221) 
Freq. Pol. News -0.0590* -0.0439 -0.0382 0.0122 0.0164 0.0216 
 (0.0325) (0.0332) (0.0335) (0.0193) (0.0192) (0.0199) 
Unemployed  0.0641 0.0434  -0.0425* -0.0502** 
  (0.0456) (0.0462)  (0.0249) (0.0255) 
Education Level  -0.0321** -0.0489***  -0.00502 -0.0122 
  (0.0146) (0.0153)  (0.00993) (0.0107) 
Married   0.0105   0.0129 
   (0.0202)   (0.0139) 
Gender (female)   0.00948   0.0203 
   (0.0196)   (0.0136) 
Age   0.00212***   -0.00104** 
   (0.000587)   (0.000408) 
Treatment*News 0.0924** 0.0781* 0.0842** 0.0269 0.0222 0.0237 
 (0.0419) (0.0424) (0.0424) (0.0273) (0.0272) (0.0272) 
Constant 0.420*** 0.461*** 0.566*** 0.0897*** 0.0988*** 0.118*** 
 (0.0280) (0.0362) (0.0615) (0.0162) (0.0230) (0.0410) 
       
Observations 2,635 2,611 2,611 2,635 2,611 2,611 
R-squared 0.002 0.005 0.010 0.010 0.011 0.014 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 



















6.3.3 Regression for Social Trust and Interest in Politics 
 
 
Table 8 contains a set of six models which describe the relationship between the two 
dependent variables, namely generalized and judiciary trust, and the respondent’s reported 
level of interest in politics, which is interacted with the treatment dummy. Structurally, the 
table uses the same formula as the two previous ones.  
 The theoretical mechanism presented in this paper suggests that perceiving an 
institutional variation is not sufficient to trigger a change in behavior or attitude. Individuals 
must also appreciate the importance of that variation and actually conceptualize it as an 
improvement. It is therefore evident that respondents who report being highly interested in 
politics will be more likely to follow the DNA’s fight against corruption and understand the 
importance of the indictment of powerful public figures for their country’s future. Given the 
decisive role of political interest in determining one’s likelihood to be affected by the 
treatment, I expect the interaction term between the treatment dummy and the variable of 
political interest to be both positive and significant.  
Once again, the coefficients presented in Table 8 show mixed results. The interaction 
term between the treatment dummy and the variable indicating the respondent’s level of 
political interest is positive across the first three models, but achieves statistical significance 
at the 0.05 level only when controls are not taken into account. Additionally, the coefficient’s 
substantive size diminishes and ultimately changes its direction, as controls are progressively 
added (i.e. from 0.06 to – 0.01), which means that the initial relationship between interest in 
politics and confidence in the judiciary following the administration of the treatment does not 
seem to be robust. The interaction coefficients for the models that focus on generalized trust 
do not fare any better. Indeed, the interaction terms appear to be negative and statistically 
significant at the 0.05 level, while their substantive size remains almost intact once controls 
are introduced. These findings clearly contradict Hypothesis3 and suggest that political 
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interest might actually negatively affect an individual’s propensity to become more trusting 
towards others – the exact opposite effect of what was initially predicted. However, it is still 
worth noting that the interaction term loses its statistical significance after transitioning to the 
fully specified Model (6), which means that any conclusion regarding its influence would still 










































 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Table 8: Linear 
Regression Models for 














       
Treatment -0.0334** -0.0171 0.224*** -0.0644*** -0.0984*** -0.230*** 
 (0.0132) (0.0180) (0.0333) (0.00944) (0.0116) (0.0285) 
Pol. Interest -0.0205 0.00783 0.0369** 0.0387*** 0.0411*** 0.0262* 
 (0.0156) (0.0178) (0.0181) (0.0132) (0.0153) (0.0158) 
Income Level  0.00967*** -0.000034  -0.00381* -0.00917*** 
  (0.00252) (0.00278)  (0.00202) (0.00218) 
Education Level  -0.0223** -0.0541***  -0.0124 -0.00186 
  (0.0105) (0.0111)  (0.00839) (0.00890) 
Married   -0.00522   -0.00590 
   (0.0140)   (0.0107) 
Gender   0.0119   -0.0137 
   (0.0132)   (0.0102) 
Age   0.00149***   0.0000813 
   (0.000415)   (0.000322) 
Year   -0.0211***   0.0118*** 
   (0.00258)   (0.00225) 
Treatment*Interest 0.0687*** 0.00488 -0.0159 -0.0233 -0.0456** -0.0339 
 (0.0242) (0.0310) (0.0309) (0.0183) (0.0209) (0.0212) 
Constant 0.375*** 0.426*** 42.73*** 0.180*** 0.221*** -23.43*** 
 (0.00763) (0.0206) (5.158) (0.00605) (0.0169) (4.489) 
       
Observations 8,256 5,266 5,264 8,256 5,266 5,264 
R-squared 0.001 0.006 0.022 0.009 0.023 0.030 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 





















6.3.4 Regression for Institutional Trust and Explanatory Variables 
 
 
Table 9 replicates the models presented above but incorporates a different measure of the 
dependent variable of institutional trust. Instead of the narrow proxy of confidence in the 
justice system, I use a 1-point scale that aggregates the respondent’s overall confidence in the 
four major institutions of the state, namely the Parliament, the Government, the Judiciary, and 
the Police. Measuring variations in the respondent’s confidence in the state’s institutions 
through such a scale can be insightful, since it operationalizes institutional trust more broadly. 
In that sense, it is plausible to assume that even among the respondents who perceived and 
appreciated the DNA’s judicial activity, some might have attributed that success to the 
country’s broader institutional framework, rather than solely the justice system.  
 Table 9 provides an interesting set of results. Indeed, the interaction terms for all of 
the three key explanatory variables are positive when using the scale of institutional trust 
rather than the dichotomous variable of confidence in the judiciary. First, the interaction term 
between the treatment dummy and the variable that determines the respondent’s urban or 
rural status is not statistically significant – a result that is consistent with the findings shown 
in Table 6. Furthermore, the coefficient of the interaction between variables of treatment and 
frequency of news consumption is positive, statistically significant at the 0.05 level, and 
substantively large (i.e. 0.1). This result also aligns with the results of Table 7. Lastly, the 
interaction implicating the variable of political interest is also positive and significant – a 
surprising outcome given the results of the same interaction for the models holding judiciary 









 (1) (2) (3) 
Table 9: Linear Regression for 
Institutional Trust and Explanatory 
Variables 
Institutional Trust Institutional Trust Institutional Trust 
    
Treatment 0.0687*** -0.0783*** 0.0592*** 
 (0.0172) (0.0199) (0.0178) 
Urban -0.0280***   
 (0.00875)   
News  -0.0530***  
  (0.0190)  
Pol. Interest   0.0182** 
   (0.00879) 
Income 0.00585***  0.00570*** 
 (0.00147)  (0.00147) 
Education -0.0373*** -0.0238*** -0.0454*** 
 (0.00582) (0.00810) (0.00574) 
Married -0.000464 0.0163 0.000745 
 (0.00736) (0.0107) (0.00733) 
Gender 0.0112* 0.0125 0.0146** 
 (0.00675) (0.0101) (0.00681) 
Age 0.000471** -3.17e-05 0.000354 
 (0.000222) (0.000313) (0.000222) 
Year -0.00831***  -0.00856*** 
 (0.00135)  (0.00137) 
Treatment*Urban 0.0114   
 (0.0161)   
Treatment*News  0.109***  
  (0.0233)  
Treatment*Interest   0.0423*** 
   (0.0161) 
Constant 17.06*** 0.501*** 17.55*** 
 (2.693) (0.0327) (2.731) 
    
Observations 5,032 2,501 5,032 
R-squared 0.023 0.017 0.025 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 














6.4 Robustness Tests 
 
 
In this subsection, I perform several robustness tests in order to verify whether the statistical 
relationships that I identified in the first half of this chapter remain relevant when using 
different kinds of models. 
In Table 10, which can be found in Appendix 1, I estimate the same models that 
appear in Tables 6 to 9, but I use logistic instead of linear regression. Some authors argue that 
logistic regression is better suited to analyze variations in binary outcomes, such as social 
trust, since it transforms the dependent variable so that it is distributed as a log-odds density 
function. Also, while the estimated magnitude of the predictor variables must be interpreted 
in a slightly different way in logistic models compared to linear ones, the interpretation of the 
coefficient’s direction and statistical significance remains the same. Thus, the interaction 
coefficients presented in Table 10 clearly prove that the original regression results maintain 
their direction, substantive size, and statistical significance throughout the six estimated 
models. Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind the logistic transformation of the 
outcome might induce nonlinearity and therefore violate the parallel trends assumption, 
which means that results should yet again be interpreted cautiously.  
In Table 11, which can be found in Appendix 2, I account for the time-invariant 
effects of Romania’s regions that could affect the variations in the outcome variable of the 
respondent populations. In order to do so, I replicate the original regression models and 
incorporate regional fixed effects. I generate a new variable that assigns the respondent’s 
geographic location to one of Romania’s four development regions (i.e. macro-regions). 
Furthermore, instead of controlling for a linear time trend, I add survey year fixed effects in 
order to better control for changes over time in mean responses across surveys. Lastly, in 
order to check for potentially confounding variables, I interact all the control variables with 
the treatment dummy. The results presented in Table 11 are almost identical to the ones 
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shown in the previous tables; I therefore conclude that my findings are robust even when 
















































VII. Conclusion and Discussion  
 
 
7.1 Summary of Findings and Discussion of Results 
 
 
This analysis has attempted to use cross-sectional data taken from three rounds of WVS 
surveys and three rounds of EVS surveys carried out in Romania between 1993 and 2012, in 
order to address the question of whether an exogenous improvement in the Romanian state’s 
ability to reduce corruption would have a stronger impact upon the evolution of social trust 
among respondents who are more likely to perceive and appreciate such a change.  
I estimate multiple linear probability regression models in order to calculate the 
probability of observing an adjustment in attitudes of trust among the people who fulfill the 
conditions that are necessary in order to perceive and appreciate the DNA’s fight again 
corruption. The regression tables indicate the following results: first, I find that the interaction 
between the treatment and urban dummy seems to have a positive and statistically significant 
differential effect among urban respondents as opposed to rural ones, but only when 
generalized trust, rather than judiciary trust, is held as the dependent variable. Second, I find 
that respondents who are frequent consumers of political news are more likely to adopt a 
more trusting attitude towards the justice system but not towards their fellow citizens after the 
treatment has occurred, compared to infrequent newsreaders. Third, I find no empirical 
support regarding the hypothesis according to which the introduction of the treatment should 
lead to a more meaningful increase in generalized or judiciary trust among people with 
greater interest in politics. Lastly, I replace the variable of judiciary trust with a broader 
indicator of trust in the state’s entire institutional framework, which yields positive results for 
the last two explanatory variables. Therefore, while empirical analysis of WVS/EVS data 
does not fully align with my initial predictions, some key results support my theoretical 
argument. First and foremost, Hypothesis1, which predicted that the treatment would have a 
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stronger effect on the evolution of social trust among urban respondents, is validated but only 
for generalized, rather than judiciary trust. Hypothesis2, which predicted that frequent 
consumers of political news were more likely to report higher levels of social trust after the 
introduction of the treatment, is also partly validated, since the results are statistically 
significant only for judiciary trust, but not generalized trust. Lastly, I reject Hypothesis3, 
which states that people who have a greater interest in politics are more likely to become 
more trusting in the period following the treatment, since the interaction coefficients 
estimated in the two fully specified models both fail to reach statistical significance, while 
also being substantively small. However, it is crucial to reiterate that given the deficiencies of 
this paper’s research design, as well as the limitations of the datasets, these results cannot be 
interpreted as evidence of causality.  
These results seem to indicate that there might be a positive relation between the 
treatment and some respondents’ propensity to adopt more trusting behavior both towards 
people in general and to formal institutions (at least when they are all lumped together). 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that the estimated coefficients of institutional trust 
models do not mirror the ones found in generalized trust models, which suggests that the 
theoretical mechanism proposed in this paper should be revisited. Ultimately, some of the 
regression results are difficult to interpret and do not have an obvious explanation. These 
results can be broadly divided into two categories. The first category is composed of the 
coefficients that have the expected direction but are substantively small. This could 
potentially be explained by the fact that the magnitude of the treatment was not large enough 
to prompt enough people to modify their attitudes. This criticism is plausible since the 
presence of the DNA was mostly noticed in Romania’s largest cities, such as Bucharest. 
Similarly, although the DNA’s effectiveness was greater than anyone in Romania had 
originally expected, high-level corruption remains high compared to most other EU countries. 
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The second category is composed of the coefficients that have an unexpected direction. This 
set of results suggest that the increase in the amount of indictments of corrupt officials could 
have a negative effect on internal levels of trust by revealing to the general public a reality 
that they had previously ignored.  
 
7.2 Conclusion  
 
 
The findings of this paper hold notable policy implications. As mentioned in the introductory 
chapter of this thesis, trust is a societal resource that acts as a lubricant for social interactions. 
Understanding how social trust is formed is therefore a powerful lesson to learn. The modest 
yet relatively encouraging findings of this paper suggest the quality of formal institutions 
could potentially influence the trust attitudes of the citizens who are governed by them. 
Although this thesis focuses on a very specific institutional improvement, embodied by the 
establishment of an anticorruption agency, the same mechanism can be extended to other 
institutions and aspects of institutional quality, such as effectiveness of governance, 
regulatory transparency etc. 
The contributions of this paper to the literature on social trust are twofold. On the one 
hand, by incorporating insights from the field of psychology, I provide a new theoretical 
mechanism that could explain how people’s attitudes of trust change depending on the 
institutional environment in which they live. On the other hand, I also make an empirical 
contribution to the debate regarding the origins of social trust by exploiting a unique 
institutional variation that has not been studied before.  
In terms of avenues for future research, I believe that the radical ongoing 
transformation of Eastern Europe will continue to provide exciting opportunities for 
experimental studies. For those specifically interested in the relationship between corruption, 
formal institutions, and social trust, incorporating more direct evidence of corruption 
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revelations would facilitate the differentiation between the effect to the existence of 
anticorruption institutions, such as the DNA, and the outcomes of their activity. Lastly, more 
fine-grained (i.e. temporally and geographically localized) survey data could also improve the 












































VIII. Appendix  
 
1. Robustness Check A 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Table 10: Logistic 
Regression for Social 














       
Treatment 0.988*** -0.126 1.044*** -2.039*** 0.484** -1.784*** 
 (0.156) (0.148) (0.163) (0.203) (0.240) (0.208) 
Urban -0.118   -0.376***   
 (0.0793)   (0.0993)   
News  -0.162   0.232  
  (0.140)   (0.236)  
Pol. Interest   0.166**   0.161* 
   (0.0826)   (0.0963) 
Income -0.00154  0.000347 -0.0629***  -0.0689*** 
 (0.0127)  (0.0127) (0.0169)  (0.0170) 
Education -0.210*** -0.210*** -0.252*** 0.0700 -0.104 -0.00630 
 (0.0525) (0.0666) (0.0520) (0.0678) (0.0951) (0.0675) 
Married -0.0246 0.0454 -0.0224 -0.0564 0.114 -0.0387 
 (0.0637) (0.0858) (0.0635) (0.0826) (0.123) (0.0819) 
Gender 0.0375 0.0409 0.0544 -0.107 0.175 -0.103 
 (0.0597) (0.0831) (0.0604) (0.0773) (0.119) (0.0777) 
Age 0.00649*** 0.00902*** 0.00688*** 0.00141 -0.00902** 0.000650 
 (0.00191) (0.00252) (0.00191) (0.00244) (0.00360) (0.00243) 
Year -0.0939***  -0.0969*** 0.0792***  0.0787*** 
 (0.0121)  (0.0122) (0.0140)  (0.0143) 
Treatment*Urban 0.0256   0.479**   
 (0.143)   (0.229)   
Treatment*News  0.357**   0.125  
  (0.178)   (0.277)  
Treatment*Interest   -0.0695   -0.262 
   (0.142)   (0.228) 
Constant 188.0*** 0.300 193.9*** -159.5*** -2.094*** -158.4*** 
 (24.13) (0.259) (24.45) (28.04) (0.385) (28.67) 
       
Observations 5,264 2,611 5,264 5,264 2,611 5,264 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 




2. Robustness Check B 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Table 11: Linear 















       
Treatment 0.437***  0.430*** -0.130  -0.125 
 (0.155)  (0.153) (0.117)  (0.117) 
Urban -0.0224   -0.0532***   
 (0.0179)   (0.0143)   
News  -0.00408   0.0224  
  (0.0390)   (0.0221)  
Pol. Interest   0.0324*   -0.00518 
   (0.0194)   (0.0174) 
Income -0.00392 -0.0199** -0.00491 -0.00168 0.00471 -0.00407 
 (0.00471) (0.00897) (0.00463) (0.00400) (0.00548) (0.00395) 
Education -0.0266* -0.0321 -0.0330** -0.00733 0.00843 -0.0150 
 (0.0136) (0.0275) (0.0134) (0.0116) (0.0181) (0.0114) 
Married 0.0491** 0.0266 0.0512*** 0.000689 -0.0127 0.00618 
 (0.0191) (0.0402) (0.0189) (0.0157) (0.0237) (0.0156) 
Gender 0.0129 -0.00477 0.0163 -0.0173 -0.0121 -0.0205 
 (0.0156) (0.0319) (0.0158) (0.0130) (0.0202) (0.0131) 
Age 0.00366*** 0.0101*** 0.00375*** 0.0106*** 0.000165 0.0102*** 
 (0.00106) (0.00193) (0.00105) (0.000771) (0.000524) (0.000750) 
Treatment*Urban 0.0109   0.0456**   
 
Treatment*Interest 
   
0.0182 
   
-0.00217 
   (0.0323)   (0.0227) 
Constant 0.419*** 0.948*** 0.419*** 0.100 0.0321 0.121* 
 (0.100) (0.181) (0.100) (0.0742) (0.0602) (0.0729) 
       
Observations 5,264 1,054 5,264 5,264 1,054 5,264 
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